New Trends in Governmental Funding of Civil Society Organisations: A Comparative Study of 9 OECD-DAC Donors by Huyse, Huib & De Bruyn, Tom
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEW TRENDS IN GOVERNMENTAL FUNDING OF 
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS 
 
A Comparative Study of 9 OECD-DAC Donors  
Huib Huyse & Tom De Bruyn  
November 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research commissioned by the Flemish NGO-Federation, Belgium 
  
 Published by 
KU Leuven 
HIVA - RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR WORK AND SOCIETY 
Parkstraat 47 box 5300, 3000 LEUVEN, Belgium 
hiva@kuleuven.be 
www.hiva.be 
 
 
 
 
© 2015 HIVA-KU Leuven 
Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvuldigd en/of openbaar gemaakt door middel van druk, fotokopie, microfilm of op welke andere wijze ook, 
zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de uitgever. 
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by mimeograph, film or any other means, without permission in writing from the publisher. 
The authors want to explicitly thank Koen Frederix from the Flemish NGO Federation for his overall 
support during the execution of the study and his critical feedback on earlier versions of the report.  
 
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not  
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Flemish NGO Federation. 
 3 
Contents 
Abbreviations 5 
Introduction 6 
1 | Funding levels: all about the money? 8 
1.1 Overall growth of CSO support masking important cross-country differences 8 
1.2 Especially aid ‘through’ CSOs on the increase 10 
1.3 Direct funding of southern CSOs increasing globally but only due to EU and UK 11 
1.4 National level remains by far the main funding channel 12 
2 | Policy frameworks: civil society support at crossroads? 13 
2.1 Civil society policy renewal as part of major ODA-reforms 13 
2.2 Expanding views on who’s in and who’s out… 16 
2.3 ..go hand-in-hand with discussions about roles 18 
2.4 Mixed experiences with donor dialogue and consultations 20 
3 | Modalities: strings attached 22 
3.1 Rationalisation and outsourcing driving institutional and policy reforms 22 
3.2 Framework agreements growing & diversifying 23 
3.3 Quest for results and its limits 25 
3.4 Early signs of changing donor – CSO relationships 29 
4 | Emerging issues & opportunities 32 
4.1 Bringing it all together: review of the 2009 trends by Nijs & Renard 32 
4.2 Other emerging themes 34 
References 41 
 
 5 
Abbreviations 
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CSO Civil society organisation 
CSR Corporate social responsibility 
DFID Department for International Development, UK 
DANIDA Danish Development Cooperation Agency 
DGD Directorate-general Development Cooperation, Belgium 
EG Engagement Global (Germany) 
EU European Union 
FDI Foreign direct investment 
GNI Gross national income 
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NGO Non-governmental organisation 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
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PPP Public private partnership 
PS4D Private sector for development 
RAM Resource Allocation Mechanism 
RBM Results Based Management 
Sida Swedish International Development Cooperation  
VfM Value for Money 
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Introduction 
Government funding of civil society is an important, and some would argue crucial, element of 
donors’ development cooperation policies. Likewise, for many civil society organisations (CSOs) 
public funds are a vital source of income. The governmental CSO support efforts and policies do not 
only differ significantly among donors, but also evolve continuously. In recent years, the financial 
and economic crisis, changes in the nature of governments, an increasingly critical assessment of 
development cooperation efforts, and the emergence of new actors in the field of international 
cooperation (e.g. the private sector, the emerging economies) have impacted to varying extents the 
policies and the distribution and volume of official development aid (ODA) of donors, and arguably 
also the support to CSOs.  
 
This report, commissioned by the Flemish NGO-Federation intends to shed light on key trends in 
governmental CSO support. More specifically the study aims to identify the most important trends 
in governmental funding in eight different OECD-DAC countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) and the EU1. These actors represent 
different approaches to development cooperation in general and CSO support in particular, and have 
experienced different evolutions in their ODA (see figure 1). From this group2, especially Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and France have reduced their aid budgets considerably since 2010. However, 
beyond presenting overall ODA figures this report identifies a more layered set of trends in the CSO 
support landscape. 
 
1 To improve the readability of the text, we do not always refer explicitly to the EU separately. When we refer to 9 donors, we actually 
mean 8 countries and the EU. 
2 WhiIe not in our sample of donors, Finland announced drastic cuts of more than 40% in its overall ODA budget in 2015. The CSO channel 
was informed by the government it would have to absorb cuts of 43%, most of them starting in 2016. It was the first time that the CSO 
channel was confronted with such drastic cuts in Finland. In the same period, funding for private sector development programmes 
was increasing substantially. 
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Figure 1 ODA as % of GNI 
 
Source OECD Stats 
 
 
This research did not have the ambition to map the policies, modalities and practices in great detail, 
but rather capture main trends and issues. Time and resource constraints determined the scope of 
the research as well as the methodology used. The study was executed over the period December 
2014 to September 2015. Per country one to three representatives of civil society organisations (most 
often NGO federations), the academic world and in some cases governmental representatives were 
interviewed on the basis of semi-structured questionnaires (mostly via skype or phone). Questions 
addressed the funding context and policy; the scope of funding; the income sources of CSOs; the 
funding modalities and criteria; funding procedures and the relationship between CSOs and the 
government. In addition, a broad set of policy documents and strategies and other information 
sources were analysed. A literature review was carried out in order to be able to compare the findings 
with insights from other studies. It included earlier comparative studies, such as those of INTRAC 
(2014a), Karlsted (2010), ECDPM (2011), Nijs & Renard (2009), and Pratt et al. (2006), aside from a 
wide range of studies and grey literature related to specific issues (donor dependency, monitoring & 
evaluation, etc.). The study made use of OECD statistical resources – though the data sources need 
careful interpretation as will be explained further on. Lastly, the findings were also confronted with 
the 2012 reference publication ’12 Lessons for Partnering with Civil Society’, as identified by OECD-
DAC.  
 
The study has focused largely on trends in structural development cooperation, and less on 
humanitarian aid. However, OECD-DAC statistics mentioned include humanitarian aid in most 
cases. 
 
The report lists the main trends regarding level of funding, the policy frameworks and involvement 
of civil society in policy making, the modalities, and concludes with emerging issues and 
opportunities.  
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1 |  Funding levels: all about the money? 
1.1 Overall growth of CSO support masking important cross-country differences  
According to 2014 figures of OECD-DAC (see figure 2), the total amount of ODA to and through 
NGOs3 of all DAC-members increased substantially from about 10.7 billion USD in 2007 to 
17.5 billion USD in 2010 and decreased slightly after to 17.0 billion USD in 2012 – after which it 
increased again to about the level of 2010. This represents a steady increase from 11.3 % in 2007 to 
16.8 % of all ODA in 2012 (figure 4). However in 2013 the share decreased to 15.4%. The nine 
donors in our study represent about half of the total amount of aid to and through CSOs of the DAC 
countries (with a minimum of 43% in 2009 and a maximum of 52% in 2010). 
Figure 2 Aid to and through CSOs (in billion USD) – total OECD-DAC 
  
Source OECD stats (USD million, 2012 prices, disbursements) 
This general trend masks important differences between the OECD-DAC countries. Within the 
nine donors in our selection, especially the growth in the ODA budget for CSOs of the UK and 
the EU institutions are remarkable on the one hand, together with the decrease in the 
Netherlands on the other hand (see figure 3). France remains by far the smallest financer of CSOs, 
 
3 ODA to and through NGOs refers to a distinction in the nature or the conditionalities of the funds given. In the case of ‘to’ funds are 
given for programmes developed by the NGOs themselves and which they implement on their own authority and responsibility. 
‘Through’ then refers to programmes developed by the ‘official sector’ (bilateral channel) and for which that same sector is ultimately 
responsible. There are reported to be significant differences in the actual application of this conceptual distinction by different OECD-
DAC donors. Though national governments are supposed to report regularly their ODA commitments and disbursements to the OECD 
according to the homogenized reporting mechanism, there might still be interpretation differences of what constitutes NGO- support.  
In addition, not all public NGO support might be included, due to difficulties to collect robust and precise information from all 
authorities that provide CSO support (sometimes different ministries and government levels offer financial support). Consequently, 
the figures of the OECD-DAC database did not correspond always with the information provided by our interviewees. 
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though its budget has steadily increased since 2012 –  there is a governmental commitment to double 
the budget for CSO in the period  2012-2017. 
Despite the general increase in funds and share of CSO support, several interviewees mentioned 
that these figures do not capture the increased pressure and discussions on CSO budgets in 
some countries. For instance the Danish government proposed cuts of about 15% (actually a 
relocation to refugee programs) in 2014 but it did not go through finally due to pressure of Danish 
CSOs. Moreover, both in Denmark and Belgium further cuts are expected in the coming years. In 
Belgium, the government has announced budget cuts of around 8,5% in the CSO channel starting 
from 2017. CSOs are still relatively well off compared to other Belgian ODA channels, where budget 
cuts of 20% or more have been announced.  
Figure 3 Aid to and Through NGOs (in million USD) – 9 donors 
  
Source: OECD stats (USD million, 2012 prices, disbursements)  
The share of CSO support (%) in total ODA shows a diverse picture: only Switzerland 
experienced a slight decrease between 2007 and 2013, while especially in Denmark, the UK and 
Belgium (after a drop in 2010) the share has increased significantly (see figure 4).  Overall, in most 
countries the CSO channel has been slightly less affected by budget cuts than other channels. 
Notwithstanding the decrease in absolute numbers, the Netherlands remained4 the country with the 
highest share of ODA dedicated to (or through) CSOs up to 2013. Excluding the EU institutions, 
Germany and France, all other countries demonstrate ODA shares for CSO around 20% or higher 
– which position them above the DAC average.  
 
4 However, further cuts were announced in the Netherlands since 2013, especially in the period 2015-2016. 
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Figure 4 Aid to and through NGOs as % of ODA 
  
Source OECD stats (% of aid to and through NGOs as share of total ODA))  
1.2 Especially aid ‘through’ CSOs on the increase 
This rise in CSO budgets seems entirely due to the growth of funds ‘through’ CSOs, which 
almost doubled between 2007 and 2010, from 7.5 billion to 14.7 billion USD (figure 2). ODA ‘to’ 
CSOs actually decreased with 28% in the same period to 2.3 billion USD in 2012. Figure 5 provides 
the overview for the 9 donors of this study. An example is the situation in the Netherlands where 
between 2009 and 2010 the ODA to CSOs decreased dramatically, while in the same period aid 
‘through’ CSOs increased almost at the same rate. While a part of the observed changes could be due 
to a change in reporting rather than an actual shift in CSO support, the overall trend of the growing 
use of the ‘through’ channel is clear. Several observers see the growing share of ODA through CSOs 
as an indication of a trend towards instrumentalising CSOs as actors which help governments 
to achieve specific developmental objectives of the governmental channel (see below), and of 
using NGOs mostly as ‘implementing partners or contractors’ (OECD 2013, p. 5).     
Figure 5 Aid to and through CSOs (in billion USD) – total for the 9 selected donors  
 
Source OECD stats (USD million, 2012 prices, disbursements)  
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1.3 Direct funding of southern CSOs increasing globally but only due to EU and UK  
The observation that the population of southern-based CSOs has increased drastically over the last 
decades, and that many developing countries now have a growing group of strong and mature CSOs, 
has resulted in an increasing interest in direct funding (see also 2.2). Several reports concluded 
that this trend would be inevitable as donors would be less inclined towards supporting 
intermediary actors (northern-based NGOs) when their added-value is decreasing in view of stronger 
southern-based CSO communities. Increasingly decentralised ODA funding decision making, 
facilitated by spectacular advancements in communication technology, were expected to re-enforce 
this trend (Nijs & Renard 2009, OECD-DAC 2013). Some reports (INTRAC 2014b) observe an 
increased interest in joint donor funds (multi-donor funds) to support southern CSOs at the country 
level, again an increasing flow to southern CSOs. The main driver is argued to be the Aid 
Effectiveness Agenda and the idea that through multi-donor funds it would be possible ‘to harmonise 
approaches, reach out to more CSOs in the global South and reduce transaction costs’ (INTRAC 
2015, p. 2).   
Initial figures5 on the funding of developing country-based NGOs, as they are called by 
OECD-DAC (2013), supported this analysis. The OECD-DAC report concluded that although 
DAC members still ‘have a strong preference for supporting donor country-based CSOs over other 
types, especially in Germany, Spain and Austria’, data for 2009-2011 showed increased funding for 
developing country-based CSOs (OECD-DAC 2013, p. 9). For this study we looked at more recent 
OECD-DAC data and conclude that while the total funding southern CSOs is clearly on the rise (see 
figure 5 – grand total), this is only due to two main actors: the EU and UK. In most OECD-
DAC countries absolute funding levels to southern CSOs are stagnating or even decreasing 
since 2011. One hypothesis to explain the reversing trend could be that aid cuts have affected direct 
funding to southern CSOs in a disproportional way as governments faced fewer risks of backlash 
when cutting in these channels. 
 
Interviewees in our study could not confirm or refute this trend. Donor agency country offices and 
embassies – the main providers of southern CSO funding via the government – are not systematically 
publishing figures on this issue. In the case of the Netherlands, subsequent policy notes since 2009 
have indicated the intention to increase the proportion of direct funding. An extensive evaluation6 of 
the Dutch direct funding mechanisms (IOB 2014), showed a decline of direct funding up to 2008 
and then an upward trend until 2012. The latest funding scheme, Strategic Partnerships 2015-2017, 
was opened up fully to southern CSOs after lively debates in the Dutch parliament. Six out of 65 
consortia which submitted a proposal were led by southern CSOs or a network of CSOs. Amongst 
the 25 consortia which were selected only one consortium is led by a southern CSO. However, as 
southern CSOs are also participating in other consortia (not as the leading actor) of which the detailed 
budget division is not yet public, the overall impact of this latest round of reforms of the Dutch 
funding schemes (see further) on funding to southern CSOs could not yet be established at the time 
of writing.  
 
The overall picture within the OECD-DAC donor community remains vague, complicated 
by discussions over numbers. As for example in Denmark, where the CSO umbrella organisation 
argues that the Danish cooperation underestimates the funds going to southern CSOs, especially 
because of the additional flows via so-called multi-donor funds, of which it is not clear if they are 
 
5 These are reported on separately in the CRS coding system only since 2009 (OECD-DAC 2013). 
6 Useful Patchwork: Direct Funding of Local NGOs by Netherlands Embassies 2006-2012, IOB Evaluation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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systematically captured under the label ‘developing country-based NGOs’, used by OECD-DAC to 
map these flows. 
Figure 6 Aid to developing-country based CSOs for the period 2009-2013 (OECD-DAC CRS database) 
 
Source OECD stats 23000 channel code (USD million, current prices, disbursements) vertical axis at left side for grand total 
1.4  National level remains by far the main funding channel  
National governments remain by far the most important public funding channel for CSOs. While a 
detailed breakdown of the budgets cannot be established easily per country, respondents confirmed 
this trend for the eight countries in the study. Though in some countries regional and local 
governments (for instance France, Germany, Belgium) do act as an important source of income for 
smaller CSOs or/and complement the funds they receive from higher authorities, the total level of 
funding does not compare to that of the national government. The main governmental financing 
institutions remain indeed the national or federal level in all countries. The importance of the 
lower governmental levels might decrease in the near future, due to budget constraints and – in 
Belgium for instance – a re-organization of the regional and local state structure (i.c. the tasks and 
responsibilities might be shifted from the provincial to other government levels).  
On the other hand, the European Union is gaining importance as a provider of subsidies – also 
because, as some interviewees argued, more and more CSO are getting acquainted with the European 
procedures to obtain funding.  
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2 |  Policy frameworks: civil society support at 
crossroads? 
2.1 Civil society policy renewal as part of major ODA-reforms  
There are indications that the policies of OECD-DAC donors on civil society and CSOs in 
developing countries are increasingly shaped by intense discussions about the future of ODA, 
although in different degrees in the nine donors of this study. These discussions take place in an era 
of turbulent changes in the economic and political global status-quo, with new powerful actors 
influencing development agendas, and with pressing global challenges such as climate change and 
inequality that remain unresolved. ODA flows are overtaken by other financial flows in most 
countries and there is a growing recognition that aid, especially in its current set-up, can only 
play a modest role in bringing about sustainable development. The debate is gradually changing 
from aid to development, with increasing attention for the policy coherence for development agenda. 
This agenda refers to the possible impact of other policy domains, such as migration, trade & 
investments, security, agriculture and climate change, on inclusive and sustainable development, and 
the importance of making sure that these policies contribute or at least not work against development 
aims. Policy coherence is gradually being incorporated in the governance frameworks of the 
government of the Netherlands, Belgium, UK, Switzerland and the Nordic countries.  
 
Finally, the debate about the Post-2015 agenda and the sustainable development goals is entering a 
crucial phase, with yet unclear implications for ODA in general and civil society more in general.  
 
Countries/regional actors with a strong reform agenda in their CSO support are the 
Netherlands, the UK, the EU, and Belgium. In countries such as Denmark and Sweden, there 
are reforms but there is no (or not yet a) drastic break with the past. In Switzerland and Germany the 
core building blocks remain the same, to some extent it is still business-as-usual.  
 
While the intensity of the reforms vary significantly between countries, we observe across the 
sample a growing concern amongst the respondents that the colour of the government-of-
the-day, more than in the past, has influence on the budgets and the modalities of operation. 
The loss of uniform support for the CSO channel across the political divide creates a lack of 
predictability for the funding modalities offered to CSOs. 
 
Although the good practice paper with 12 lessons for partnering with CSOs by OECD-DAC (2012) 
highlights the importance of an overarching civil society policy, many donors have not updated 
their CSO policies recently. The INTRAC review of CSO donor policies (2014a), posed the 
question whether civil society policies were actually on the demise. The authors noticed that quickly 
after the 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra in 2008, a number of donor countries 
developed civil society policies (Sweden in 2009, Ireland in 2008), Strategy (Denmark 2009) or 
Guiding Principles (Norway 2009), but that in the five years thereafter, apart from Denmark and 
France (see below), the countries in their study did not review these documents. Some of them were 
not even valid anymore (in the case of Sweden). The authors suggest that this evolution might be 
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part of a trend of decentralisation to the partner country level, in which national development 
strategies and policies become the guiding policy framework for civil society, and consequently the 
‘eclipsing’ of civil society in ‘broader development frameworks’ (INTRAC 2014a, p. 3). The 
data collected for our country studies is partially confirming this trend with about 5 or 6 out 
of nine donors gradually shifting CSO programming to the country-level. This is the case for Belgium 
with its new ‘integrated programme’ approach7 and the EU with the CSO Road Maps per country, 
but also partially the UK, the Netherlands, and to some extent Nordic countries which work for 
example with multi-donor pooled CSO funds. On the other hand, a substantial number of donors 
(5 in our sample) continue to channel a large part of their CSO funding through framework-
like types of funding, where individual home-based CSOs or consortia have the right of 
initiative to submit proposals within broad geographic and thematic criteria. Three countries 
in the study have recent or emerging CSO policies which are based on this approach. Denmark is at 
the forefront with the publication in 2014 “Policy for Danish Support to Civil Society”. While 
previous documents were strategies, this time the Danish Government has opted to launch it as a 
policy framework to give it more political weight, in order to stimulate embassies to use it. Germany 
published a strategy on working with civil society in 2013 (“Participating, engaging, making a 
difference. Strategy on working with civil society in German Development Policy”) and in 
anticipation to the post-2015 agenda (“Strategy on government-civil society cooperation in post-2015 
development policy”) in October 2014. In Sweden negotiations between CSOs and the government 
were ongoing in 2015 for the development of a new strategy, reported in a final stage in September 
2015. France, through AFD, adopted a strategy in support of CSOs in November 2013. Switzerland 
did not renew its CSO policy. All these countries continue to use framework-like types of funding. 
Belgium is a special case. The advanced negotiations between Belgian development CSOs and the 
government have resulted in a consensus ‘framework agreement’ (draft) focused mainly on 
operational issues related to the funding modalities and principles, but the text stipulates that the 
government commits itself to develop an overall CSO strategy in the near future. The right of 
initiative is explicitly acknowledged, but the rather long list of geographic and other conditionalities 
of the new framework are a break from earlier funding practices.  
 
In some ways, the current period has something of a transitional period in which the direction is 
not fully clear, partially because the implications of the SDG framework are still emerging and 
therefore also the implications for CSO programming are unknown. The lack of convergence on 
how ODA should be made more relevant and what the specific roles should be of CSOs also 
emerges when one compares the CSO policies and practices of the 9 donors in this review.  
 
Some countries have not developed new comprehensive CSO policies, but drastic changes 
in their funding mechanisms have shaken the domestic CSO communities. In the Netherlands, 
in the new funding framework (Samenspraak & Tegenspraak, 2014) significant budget cuts went hand 
in hand with an exclusive focus on the funding of lobby & advocacy roles. At the same time, there is 
also a strong push for CSOs to join hands and submit via consortia, and finally competition was 
increased by allowing southern-based CSOs to take the lead in consortia. In the UK, the government 
has increasingly pushed CSOs in service delivery roles, partially because it required the CSO capacity 
to deliver on the ambitious development targets it had set itself (according to an interviewee), but 
also because of the strong push for results and the value for money agenda, which orients many CSOs 
to programmes with tangible service-delivery targets. Finally, also the regulation which states that 
DFID funding can no longer be used by CSOs to set up any lobby & advocacy activities which target 
the UK government, tends to push them further into more technical, apolitical roles. The fact that 
 
7 The right of initiative is maintained in the sense that CSOs have the freedom to propose programmes, but all the Belgian CSOs in a 
given partner country have to do a joint context analysis and develop a joint strategic programming framework. In the 15 partner 
countries of the bilateral cooperation, the government expects coordination efforts between Belgian CSOs and the bilateral channel. 
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these drastic changes are not embedded in an overall policy on CSOs has raised critiques. For example 
the OECD-DAC Peer Review (2015) of UK aid states: “…(DFID) has not communicated an overall 
vision for engaging with CSOs, which would be useful for guiding its partners.” The policy gap is 
now gradually being addressed. Recently, DFID launched a strategic review process of its civil society 
partnerships, the first time that it engages in such an extensive and interactive policy development 
process on the CSO channel. The Civil Society Partnership Review (CSPR) runs between July and 
November 2015 and is expected to result in a total renewal of the way DFID funds CSOs. The 
exercise is framed as an explicit attempt to restructure the CSO partnerships in such a way that more 
can be delivered to the world’s poorest. At the same time, DFID wants to have “a more thoughtful, 
innovative, strategic and fairer relationship”8 with UK-based and southern CSOs. The NGO 
umbrella structure BOND was asked to set up an online consultation process through social media. 
One of the outcomes is a list with 10 recommendations9 for DFID which BOND and its members 
want to be considered when reviewing the CSO partnership approach. Several recommendations 
relate to the need for more learning, innovation, and frameworks that go beyond traditional project 
logics, but also customising the modalities for different types of CSOs. Finally, during the writing of 
this report, in Belgium the government had finalised intensive negotiations with the Belgian CSOs 
and other indirect actors with on the table rather drastic reforms, especially in terms of its wish to 
enhance coordination and complementarity between the different Belgian CSOs working in a partner 
country, and in the second instance with the bilateral channel. This resulted in a new overall 
Framework Agreement between the government and the CSOs in July 2015 outlining a number of 
operational modalities and principles. In addition, also Belgium wants to respond to critiques raised 
in the latest OECD-DAC Peer Review on the lack of a CSO policy framework. In October 2015 the 
process was launched to develop a new policy note (‘Political Note’) on the role and position of CSOs 
in the Belgian development cooperation by December 2015. 
 
Table 1 gives a short overview of emerging issues in recent CSO policies and funding frameworks 
which are either shared or not across the sample of 9 donors. In the coming sections these will be 
discussed more in detail. 
Table 1: Overviews of new areas of attention in CSO policy notes 
Shared across the sample Not-shared across the sample  
 Push for results and efficiency  
 Incentives to improve M&E 
practices and organisational 
learning 
 Increased attention for private 
sector 
 Increased focus on direct support to southern CSOs  
 Move to decentralised partner country-based decision 
making for funding 
 New CSO roles pushed by OECD-DAC donors 
 Pushing for inclusive partnerships (with gov and/or 
private sector) and/or working in consortia 
 More attention for fragile states 
 Attention for South-South cooperation 
 Increased alignment with EU policies 
 Attention for the enabling environment for CSOs to 
flourish in developing countries 
 Fragmentation in CSO community 
 Attention for Global Public Goods (climate change, ..) 
 
 
8 Civil Society Partnership Review – FAQs – GOV.UK (September 2015): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-society-
partnership-review; accessed in November 2015 
9 BOND submission to DFID’s Civil Society Partnership Review: https://www.bond.org.uk/news/dfid-review (accessed in November 2015) 
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2.2  Expanding views on who’s in and who’s out…  
Except for some countries (e.g. Germany, Switzerland), where there is a long history of funding other 
CSOs than the traditional NGO community (for example political foundations and churches), in 
most OECD-DAC countries the home-based NGO community had an almost exclusive access to 
domestic ODA sources until a decade ago. The situation is gradually evolving, for example also 
illustrated in the changing terminology used, with a growing number of OECD-DAC donors using 
the term civil society organisation (CSO) instead of NGO. The expanding views of donors of 
whom they want to partner with relate to the type of actors, the nature of the cooperation and 
the role of intermediaries.  In at least 5 out of 9 donors there is a deliberate strategy to widen 
the group of CSO beneficiaries beyond the traditional home-based NGOs, including in the 
UK, EU, the Netherlands, Denmark10, and Sweden. In Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and France 
there is no drastic change in the CSO profiles that are supported. 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the type of CSOs the OECD-DAC donors in the study are currently 
financing/supporting, with an estimate of the relative (financial) weight of the funding compared to 
the other CSO actors that are funded11.  
Table 2: types of CSO actors that are financed/supported (Legend (estimates): ‘ ‘=not at all; *=to a limited extent; 
**=quite extensively; ***=central in approach) 
Type of CSO OECD-DAC donor funding them 
 NL UK DK DE SE EU CH BE FR 
Large NGOs & INGOs *** *** *** ** *** *** *** ** ** 
Medium sized & small NGOs 
(programme  & project based) 
** ** ** *** * ** ** *** *** 
Faith-based NGOs and/or 
groups 
** ** ** *** * * ** ** * 
Trade unions & political 
foundations 
** * * *** * **  ** ** 
Southern CSOs (direct funding) * ** *  * **    
Social economy & social 
entrepreneurship organisations 
** * * ? ? * * * * 
Citizen initiatives  * ** ** ** * * * * * 
Diaspora organisations * ** * *     ** 
Other groups (volunteers, ..)  ** * **    * * 
 
         
 
Several donors are designing specific funding mechanisms for the non-traditional CSO players 
in line with the recommendations of the 2012 OECD-DAC report (12 lessons for partnering with 
CSOs). For example, in Germany, the UK, Sweden, France and Denmark specific funding channels 
 
10 Although the use of framework agreements for the funding of home-based NGOs remains a central component of the Danish CSO 
funding.  
11 This assessment was done on the basis of the available information and the interviews. It is not exhaustive and only captures broad 
trends and therefore might miss out on some CSO actors that are supported by specific donors. 
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are designed for smaller NGOs, for political foundations or trade unions, or for diaspora 
organisations. In the case of Southern CSOs, some donors are pooling their resources at the local 
level, such as through multi-donor funds (INTRAC, 2014b).  
Belgium followed the opposite path by bringing together all the different types of CSOs, local 
authorities and universities under one funding framework (Indirect Actors). Earlier frameworks 
contained specific funding modalities and funding cycles for NGOs, trade unions, universities, quasi-
governmental agencies and municipalities. For cost-efficiency reasons these were brought together 
in the period 2013-2014. The fact that they were forced under the same framework and, in addition 
were expected to work in a more integrated way was critiqued by many organisations. More recent 
negotiations (April-August 2015) between the indirect actors and the government have resulted in 
draft texts that distinguish again between typical CSOs/NGOs versus actors that are part of or have 
institutional linkages with governmental structures, such as municipalities and universities. Aside 
from these two categories, no further sub-divisions are made in the proposed funding modalities.  
 
In several countries donors put forward hard incentives (e.g. conditionality to receive funding) 
and/or soft incentives (promotion/sensitisation) for CSOs to work through consortia, other 
multi-stakeholder approaches, and/or partnerships with the private sector. Three countries 
are creating incentives for enhanced cooperation between CSOs. For example, in the Netherlands 
and Sweden there is an increasing expectation that CSOs submit funding proposals in consortia with 
other Dutch/Swedish CSOs, or with INGOs, and/or southern CSOs. In the new Belgian policy 
framework CSO coordination is currently understood in a reductionist way with hard incentives to 
push CSO coordination between Belgian CSOs who operate in the same country. The agreement 
between the minister and the CSOs makes the in-country coordination of Belgian CSOs a condition 
for funding. This implies that Belgian CSOs have to coordinate their activities based on a joint context 
analysis and shared result frameworks (‘Joint Strategic Frameworks’). The bulk of CSO funding (90%) 
will be spent through these integrated programmes. There are already signs that the hard incentives 
to stimulate the coordination between Belgian actors are demanding significant transaction costs 
through increased pressure for meetings between CSOs and alignment of planning frameworks.  
 
The quest for more coordination and cooperation is also strongly reflected in the partnership 
paradigm of the Busan declaration. This is widely picked up by donors, with an almost uniform call 
amongst the group of donors in the study for more partnerships between CSOs and private 
sector actors. Finally, only Denmark advocates in its recent policy for more South-South 
cooperation partnerships.  
 
In some policies12 reference is made to the fact that the expanding views on which CSOs donors 
should partner with, has implications for the home-based NGO community, as is the case for 
the Danish policy: 
“The Right to a Better Life emphasises that Denmark will continue to support small and 
medium-sized civil society organisations. This will be done increasingly through direct 
support to civil society organisations in the global South.” 
 
In a recent paper by the UK-based NGO umbrella organisation BOND a similar analysis is made: 
“Many of those roles that UK-based INGOs currently play could and should be played by 
southern civil society in the future.” 
 
 
12 A reference paper for NORAD in 2014 on this topic also made strong arguments along similar lines with serious implications for the 
Norwegian NGO community, but the current status of the paper is unclear. 
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The international debate on the opportunities and risks of direct or decentralised funding of 
CSOs has not settled. A 2014 review of the Dutch modality for direct funding (IOB 2014) provides 
a useful round-up of some key arguments. On the positive side, there is the recognition that the 
southern CSO community has grown more diverse and stronger. Direct funding is seen as a flexible 
modality that helped Dutch embassies to strengthen the local CSO community in a punctual way, to 
get to know civil society better, and indirectly strengthen the credibility of those local CSOs. On the 
other hand, the review identified risks to the practice of ad-hoc and activity based funding of civil 
society, arguing that funding individual projects is not the same as civil society development. In 
addition, only certain types of CSOs tended to have access to the networks of embassies. The lack of 
policy guidelines on when and how to use direct funding was found to decrease its strategic relevance. 
Finally, most often there was also no coordination amongst donors on how to support the local CSO 
landscape leading to risks for gaps or overlaps (IOB 2014). The evaluation makes a case for pooled 
funding mechanisms, at the same time avoiding too much bureaucracy not to lose the personal 
contacts and flexibility of the existing mechanisms. Multi-donor funds have been one response to 
the call for a more coordinated and integrated approach to CSO support at country level, but these 
still face a number of operational challenges (INTRAC 2014b). 
2.3 ..go hand-in-hand with discussions about roles 
Previous classifications of the roles for CSOs would typically distinguish between the roles of service 
delivery, capacity development, and the watchdog role (lobby & advocacy)13. This is called the 
‘Change Triangle’ in Danish policy documents. Reviews of CSO policies in the period 2000-2011 
concluded that there was a trend amongst OECD-DAC donors to be much more critical for 
the service delivery roles to avoid systematically replacing the role of the state. There was a push 
for more attention for capacity development strategies on the one hand and strengthening the 
watchdog role of CSOs on the other. This shift away from service-delivery is still visible amongst 
some donors, but the discussions about roles have become more layered and complex due to 
range of internal and external drivers. A set of drivers creates more diversity in the CSO roles. 
First of all, the growing diversity of CSOs (including trade unions, social entrepreneurs, diaspora 
organisations, citizen initiatives, etc.) that are supported by donors immediately implies a more diverse 
set of roles as these actors fulfil additional roles in society compared to NGOs. Secondly, the 
widening set of development goals that are now on the international agenda, for example in the area 
of climate change, globalised trade and value chains, migration and security, etc. has set in motion 
new thinking about the roles that CSOs can and should play, such as a role as broker in multi-
stakeholder processes, linking local challenges to global developments, and organising civil society at 
the regional and international level. Thirdly, with the important role of the private sector 
acknowledged and pushed by the donor community, CSOs are increasingly expected to partner with 
business to scale-up and innovate, and/or act as social entrepreneur. Others push the watchdog 
function of CSOs to counter balance the growing power of the private sector.  
Other drivers push the service delivery role back on the donor agendas as described earlier on. 
The strong orientation on tangible development results and the setting of ambitious development 
targets has contributed to donors such as the UK and the EU to push the service-delivery role of 
CSOs. Bringing all this material together gives a mixed picture as displayed in Table 3. 
 
13 A fourth role which is supported by many donors is that of development education and awareness raising in the donor country itself. 
 19 
Table 3: Update of supported CSO roles by 9 OECD-DAC donors (Legend (estimate): ‘ ‘=not at all; *=to a limited 
extent; **=quite extensively; ***=central in approach) 
CSO role NL UK DK DE SE EU CH BE FR 
Service delivery * *** * * * *** ** *  
Capacity development *  
(L&A) 
** *** ** ** ** ** *** *** 
Lobby & advocacy *** * 
(abroad) 
*** ** 
(abroad) 
** ** * ** *** 
Development education & 
awareness raising 
* ** ** ** ** **  ** ** 
Partnerships & networking ** ** ** ** * * * * *** 
Broker, process facilitation, . yes yes yes ? yes yes ? yes yes 
South-South cooperation * ** ** * * ** * * / 
Social entrepreneurship ** ** * * * * * * * 
 
The OECD-DAC report on 12 lessons for partnering with CSOs is stressing the importance for 
donors of having an explicit and comprehensive policy and clear strategy on CSOs and their 
roles in specific partner countries and how the CSO support relates to other channels which are 
funded. In many cases the policies are non-existing or remain rather vague, except for 
Denmark, and to some extent Germany and France. For example, as was pointed out earlier on the 
2015 OECD-DAC peer review of UK Aid is explicitly pointing at the lack of overall guiding 
framework for the CSO strategies DFID is developing.  
 
The Netherlands have been most drastic in re-orienting the roles of the CSOs it is funding. As 
indicated, the main funding channel (Strategic partnerships) is now only playing out the lobby & 
advocacy role. Aside from proving their expertise regarding lobby & advocacy, the applicants are also 
expected to indicate in their proposals how they want to relate to and work together with the Dutch 
government. In this way the Dutch government wants to make sure that CSO lobby & advocacy 
efforts are in synergy with their own efforts. While the call for proposals recognises that partnerships 
with the government can span both cooperative and more antagonistic relationships, several 
observers wondered whether future governments will be as accommodating to critical CSOs as the 
current one states that it will be. Several sources see a risk for a bigger grip of the government (of the 
day). Some observers wonder whether it is not creating indirect incentives for CSOs to design 
government-friendly programmes to avoid more difficult or conflictual partnerships. These policy 
changes in combination with heavy budget cuts over several rounds, have seriously shaken-up the 
traditional Dutch NGO community. The main umbrella organisation PARTOS and many established 
NGOs have been remarkably diplomatic in their responses to all these changes, but some leading 
NGO voices talk about an almost fatal blow14 to the Dutch NGO community15, with major NGOs 
having to stop their operations or lay-off a large parts of their staff. The impact of these reforms on 
southern partner organisations is much less documented but with a leading source of funding ending 
so abruptly it can be expected to be dramatic in many cases. 
 
14   As an example, the Dutch NGO ICCO was receiving about 130 milion EURO in 2010 under the MFS I funding line , this was decreased 
to 70 milion under MFS II, and has now been brought down to 6,9 milion EURO under the latest round of funding. This is not an exception 
in the current NGO landscape.  
15 See for example: http://www.viceversaonline.nl/2015/03/maakbaarheid-is-een-kostbare-illusie/ and 
http://www.oxfamnovib.nl/Oxfam-Novibs-reactie-op-richtbedrag-voor-het-Strategisch-Partnerschap.html (accessed in November 
2015)  
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The Dutch example seems to indicate that too many policy reforms and drastic turns over short 
periods of time create havoc and are not necessarily going to bring the necessary renewal in the CSO 
community which many observers are hoping for. Change will first of all have to come from within.  
 
With the exception for the efforts of a relatively small group of NGOs, several respondents indicated 
that the broader NGO community has been rather slow in taking the lead in internal reforms and 
innovation. Some NGO umbrella structures are trying to steer the dialogue on future roles and 
responsibilities. In the UK the NGO umbrella organisation BOND has released a new working paper 
in the ‘Development Futures’ programme, looking at how a range of megatrends affect the future 
roles of UK-based INGOs. To maintain relevance, the paper sees a change towards six distinct roles 
for UK-based INGOs emerging in the coming ten to fifteen years (see chapter 4). As a global 
platform of CSOs, CIVICUS and some other global CSO players have communicated explicitly in 
2015 about the decreasing relevance of the mainstream practices of the traditional NGO community. 
At the European level, CONCORD has initiated similar critical internal review and visioning 
processes, but so far they are not widely picked-up in the sector. In Belgium, the Belgian NGO 
Federations are running internal visioning processes, but it is too early to assess the impact and 
internal support for these exercises. 
2.4 Mixed experiences with donor dialogue and consultations 
The OECD-DAC report (2012) on good practices in supporting CSOs emphasizes in its fifth lesson 
the importance of a meaningful dialogue between government and civil society. Most countries have 
a tradition of government-civil society/NGO dialogue, but in the absence of clearly up-to-date CSO 
policies and frameworks, the quality of the actual donor-CSO relationship seems to depend 
increasingly on the ad-hoc perspectives of the government-of-the-day or even the minister in 
charge. As such, in most countries of this study the NGO umbrella representatives were generally 
rather positive about the dialogue with the government, but many experienced increased 
steering through the use of conditionalities or additional procedures (RBM, VfM, .. see also 
chapter 3) or were expecting problems in the coming period.  
Some examples to illustrate this situation: In the UK the umbrella organisation BOND is positive 
about the fact that DFID is consulting them on a regular basis on different issues, but at the same 
time over the last decade several reforms, for example in the Programme Partnership Arrangements 
(PPA), have affected the dialogue between CSOs and DFID. The outsourcing to consultancy bureaus 
of key tasks of the management of these PPAs has removed the direct contacts between DFID staff 
and CSOs. Also the decision to no longer allow lobby & advocacy work targeting UK policies is 
making the relationship more difficult. In France, for instance, in 2008 the French government 
suspended the existing bodies in which the international cooperation policies and instruments of 
France were discussed between different actors, but at the demand of CSOs a new body was created 
in 2014. In that year, the government installed a dialogue and coordination platform, the ‘Conseil 
national pour le Développement et la Solidarité Internationale’, consisting of representatives of the 
different governmental levels and civil society representatives.  
An important effort to improve the dialogue with civil society actors at country- and 
international level was taken by EU in the period 2012-2014, although it is to be seen if it 
results in better CSO support programmes. In 2010 the Commission launched the Structured 
Dialogue process with CSOs and local authorities. Through this dialogue the Commission reviewed 
its funding practices of CSOs and worked towards a consensus on a renewed approach for the 
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support of civil society. This resulted in 2012 in a new EU Communication on ‘Europe's engagement 
with Civil Society in external relations’, describing the principles and strategies for the renewed 
approach. This process should lead to the development of CSO Roadmaps per partner country which 
are expected to contain an in-depth analysis of the CSO landscape and an analysis of possible 
strategies for structured support. The experiences with this new approach are still limited, but an 
initial review in 2014 by the NGO umbrella Concord was carefully positive (Concord 2014).  
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3 |  Modalities: strings attached 
3.1 Rationalisation and outsourcing driving institutional and policy reforms  
The institutional set-up of donor departments responsible for the CSO channel differs between the 
9 donors in our study, but some patterns emerge. At the national level, it is typically the ministry in 
charge of development cooperation which coordinates the ODA to CSOs, although the actual 
management and distribution of funds tends to be spread over different governmental and external 
entities. An important trend in many countries, such as Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, and the UK, is the institutional reform of CSO departments of donor agencies 
(another trend, i.e. the re-organization of modalities, will be discussed in a later section). This 
manifests itself in two (sometimes contradictory) ways.  
Firstly, there is a rationalization and centralization of entities responsible for the CSO support 
in order to render the management of CSO funding less dispersed and complex, to decrease 
management costs and to create opportunities for alignment with bilateral governmental policies. 
Arguably Germany underwent the biggest re-organization of the donors in this study: part of an 
overall restructuring of government’s international cooperation, big parts of the CSO budgets were 
centralized through the creation of a new institution, Engagement Global (EG) in 2012. EG has an 
overall responsibility to administer and manage the CSO funding channels, but also scholarships and 
programmes by local authorities. The restructuring was initiated from a cost-effectiveness perspective 
but should also reflect the growing importance Germany wants to attribute to the CSO channel. 
There are indications that this re-structuring was generally received positively by German NGOs and 
CSOs with some reservations about the way EG communicates about its own institutional status. 
The fact that it is perceived insufficiently transparent about its strong links with government creates 
confusion towards external stakeholders whether it should be seen as part of civil society or not. In 
Belgium, the Federal ministry DGD has been the subject of a substantial re-structuring exercise in 
the period 2012-2014, with consequences for the way CSO channels are being managed and followed-
up. First of all, in the past NGO-DGD relationships for a given NGO were managed by one DGD 
officer per NGO. The follow-up is now organised geographically, implying that NGOs that are 
operating in many countries have their proposals screened and followed-up by different DGD staff 
members. The Flemish NGO Federation observed that, overall, the review of applications was more 
in-depth for individual country programmes, but at the same time the current set-up does not 
facilitate the review and follow-up of the cross-country coherence of the CSO programmes. Other 
consequences of this new set-up are yet to be experienced. The ministry cites both cost-cutting 
measures as a driver for the reforms, as well as an attempt to bring the functioning of DGD more in 
line with evolving trends in the development cooperation architecture. In the Netherlands, the drastic 
re-orientation of CSO funding away from service-delivery activities towards advocacy & lobby, went 
hand in hand with a relocation of the departments managing CSO funding channels to the 
department for social development (DSO). While we are only in the initial roll-out of the new funding 
scheme, several NGOs are positive about the new role DSO is playing, as it has been seen engaging 
seriously with the 25 selected lobby & advocacy consortia16. In Denmark, there is a trend towards 
 
16 http://www.viceversaonline.nl/2015/03/vrijdagmiddagborrel-aan-haar-stand-verplicht/  (accessed in November 2015) 
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supporting larger framework agreements with selected NGOs to decrease the administrative burden 
on the ministry. In France the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shifted most of the responsibility for the 
management of the CSO-budget to the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) in 2008. 
 
Secondly, there is further trend towards outsourcing certain responsibilities, such as the 
management of specific subsidizing channels to third parties in order to decrease the management 
and administrative costs. Third parties can be umbrella organizations of CSOs or private companies 
such as consultancy bureaus. This is the case in more than half of the countries of the sample, 
examples were provided for the UK, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In the UK 
funding modalities are increasingly managed by consultancy bureaus, for example PwC for the Girls 
Education Challenge Fund and TripleLine for the Civil Society Challenge Fund  Other areas of grant 
management, such as due diligence are contracted out to KPMG; and monitoring, evaluation & 
learning to Coffey International. In the partner countries, DFID is outsourcing the management of 
multi-donor trust funds in support of local CSOs to third parties (NGO structures, foundations, or 
consultancy groups). The UK NGO umbrella organisation BOND did a survey with 93 agencies 
(mainly INGOs and NGOs) receiving funding through one of these grant programmes. While overall 
the respondents were moderately positive about the way the consultancy bureaus were managing the 
funds (especially the smaller NGOs appreciated the training and support they received), there were 
concerns about increased bureaucracy, the transaction costs and cost-effectiveness of this 
arrangement, and the lack of direct interaction with DFID resulting in missed opportunities for joint 
learning. In the Netherlands, grant management is also increasingly outsourced to consultancy 
bureaus. In Denmark, the umbrella organization CISU manages one of the main subsiding channels 
for small grants. The ministry also outsourced more NGO programmes by cutting the funding 
channel for ‘programmatic NGOs’ (about 50 NGOs) and moving a majority to the channel for small 
NGOs, managed by the umbrella NGO structure. A similar arrangement is set up in Sweden with 4 
umbrella structures managing different parts of the funding. Finally, in Belgium, the government 
outsourced the screening of the organisational and administrative capacity of NGOs to consultancy 
bureaus. More substantially, starting from 2017 some CSOs will be funded directly by the government 
and others will have to apply with the NGO umbrella structures. Criteria and modalities are yet to be 
discussed.  
3.2 Framework agreements growing & diversifying  
A recent comparative study by INTRAC (2014a) provides a useful overview of how six key CSO 
donors work with framework agreements. The study looks at four donors which are also in this study 
(UK, Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden), complemented by Norway and Ireland. One of the ideas 
behind this type of financing is that it provides long-term, stable17 funding which should make it 
easier for CSOs with a proven track record to scale-up and implement ambitious 
programmes, but also to innovate and take some risks, and learn systematically from pilots. 
This modality is also expected to be easier to manage for donors than individual projects and 
programmes, however the INTRAC study concludes that these types of framework agreements are 
not “low maintenance’.  On the down-side, the study points, amongst others, that it is often more 
difficult to attribute results to this type of funding, and there is some risk that it breeds 
complacency on the side of the CSO.  
 
17 ‘Stable’ is not really the case for the recent round of strategic partnerships funding in the Netherlands. A Social Network Analysis (see 
http://loop2.org/?p=793, accessed November 2015) by consultants from Double Loop illustrated that 38 organisations lost their 
funding and 30 new organisations acquired funding with the move from the previous 3 year round of framework agreements (MFS II) 
to the current round. Looking only at the situation of the Dutch NGOs, one can conclude that 21 out of 50 NGOs who received 
funding in the previous round now fell without funding. 13 new foreign CSOs received funding. In addition, most of the selected NGOs 
received much less compared to previous rounds. 
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Over the last few years, at least four donors in our sample have increased the budgets for 
framework agreements. The Netherlands is the main exception with drastic budget cuts in the CSO 
channel (about 65% for the newest round of framework agreements). In Germany and Switzerland 
the number of strategic partnerships has remained more or less the same over the last few years.  
 
In most countries these frameworks are captured by the larger domestic NGOs, except for the 
UK and the Netherlands18 where they are gradually opening-up for CSOs from other countries.   
 
A major trend which the INTRAC researchers observe is the progressive introduction of results-
based approaches by donors inside these frameworks. In some cases, such as in the UK and the 
past MFS II framework in the Netherlands, the funding framework is so prescriptive that it is more 
similar to a programmatic approach than a strategic funding scheme. 
 
The study also observes an increase in diversity of types of CSOs in these schemes (including 
global CSOs), also raising questions around the uniform systems, procedures and appraisal 
criteria that are currently applied. For example, the “one size fits all” approach used by SIDA for 
the organisational assessment of CSO partners with framework agreements was questioned in a 
recent Swedish paper by SIPU (2014), for further analysis see also section 2.2. 
Table 4: Number of framework agreements & budgets (based on INTRAC (2014a) and own incomplete data)  
Country # Framework 
agreements 
(previous round) 
# Framework 
agreements 
(latest round) 
Latest round 
Annual budget 
(Euro millions) 
Average size 
(Euro millions) 
Netherlands  20 consortia 25 consortia  
(64 CSOs, 50 Dutch)   
185  7.4 
UK  26 consortia 41 consortia 145 3.5 
Denmark  6 15 105 7 
Germany19   1620 ? ? 
Sweden  15 16 205 12.8 
EU  ? ? ? 
Switzerland  20 ? ? 
Belgium21   / / / 
France  0 0 0 
Norway   29 159.2 5.3 
Ireland  16 62.7 3.9 
 
 
 
18 Only one consortium with a Southern CSO in the lead was finally selected in the group of 25 funded consortia. 
19  This number consists of 2 church-related NGOs, 8 Social Structure NGOs, and political foundations (which are normally not counted 
as CSOs by the German government). The political foundations received 230 milion Euro in 2015. 
20 These are 2 church-related NGOs, 8 social structure NGOs, and 6 political foundations. 
21 Belgium does not have framework agreements, but its system of ‘programme NGOs’ has some characteristics from strategic funding 
(although detailed logframes are required by DGD). Up to 2015 Belgium counted 58 programme NGOs, of which a majority are small 
NGOs with only a few staff members. The system is currently being reviewed and the government has indicated its intention to limit 
the number of small NGOs in the new funding framework. 
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3.3 Quest for results and its limits 
Over time, CSO funding has been subject of an increasing set of conditionalities, most of them 
aiming to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the CSO channel, and improving its 
complementarity with other channels.  
 
Table 5 gives an overview of main conditionalities for the key funding channels of the 9 donors in 
the study. A first way that donors try to influence CSO programming is by setting thematic 
conditionalities. For example, by tying substantial parts of the CSO budget to achieving specific 
development targets in areas such as health, education, and agriculture, the UK has over the years 
increased the volume of funding with thematic conditionalities. The biggest CSO funding channel in 
the Netherlands (Strategic Partnerships) does not impose thematic conditionalities in terms of sectors 
or specific objectives, but only accepts proposals for the role of lobby and advocacy. The Dutch 
government also expects CSOs to submit in consortia, work in partnership with the government, 
outlining very clearly how they see their partnership with the Dutch government. Aside from this 
funding line, the government also launches call for proposals around four main thematic areas. As 
indicated earlier on, the Belgian government is pushing hard for more coordination, coherence and 
complementarity in terms of sectors and objectives amongst Belgian CSOs but also between CSOs 
and the bilateral channel. This is likely to have thematic implications for the corresponding CSOs at 
some stage.  
 
In terms of geographic conditionalities most countries expect CSOs to focus on least income 
countries (LIC) or middle income countries (MIC) if they want to access funding. In some countries 
there is an increased focus on fragile states, as is the case for the UK and Belgium. The most drastic 
example is Belgium where the government is re-orienting the bulk of its ODA to fragile states and 
LICs in Central and West Africa (14 countries in total), and CSOs are expected to follow the bilateral 
channel with part of their programming to those countries. From the 52 countries in the current 
funding scheme, starting from 2017 90% of the CSO funding will be limited to 32 countries and one 
theme (decent work) themes and to 30 countries or themes starting from 2022. A relatively small part 
of the budget (10%) will be reserved for  programming in other countries (at more strict co-funding 
requirements).  
Table 5: Overview of thematic and geographic conditionalities for main funding channels 
Country Thematic conditionalities / 
roles 
Geographic conditionalities 
(aside from LICs & MICs) 
Netherlands  Yes (Strat Partnerships,thematic calls) Only lower MICs 
UK  Yes (call for proposals)  No (but preference for fragile states) 
Denmark No (only strategic fit with 2014 policy) No 
Germany  No (except for some thematic funds) No 
Sweden Platform policy No 
EU Yes (call for proposals) No 
Switzerland No No 
Belgium  No22  50 countries23     
France No No 
 
 
22 Future: integrated approach with coordination towards other Belgian CSOs and bilateral channel, and limited use of call for proposals 
23 More strict regulation expected: less countries (33), and this number includes by default the current 14 bilateral partner countries. CSO 
can choose 18 countries/themes by themselves.  
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A second and growing range of conditionalities has been introduced in the areas of 
effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and market-based mechanisms. Table 6 illustrates the 
diversity of incentives and control systems that donors have developed over the years. Especially in 
the last five to ten years there is an expansion of new conditionalities of this type such as Value 
for Money, Payment by Results, IATI, and the Resource Allocation Mechanisms (RAM), but 
also systematic broadening of requirements in existing conditionalities (monitoring & 
evaluation, results-based management). Regarding the latter, the table does not show the many 
incremental additional requirements that have been introduced in the area of monitoring & evaluation 
and the pressure to show quantitative development results.  
 
Value for Money and the IATI standard are already relatively well known in the international NGO 
community and have been described in several papers of the UK-based NGO umbrella structure, 
BOND, such as Value for money: what it means for UK NGOs (2012) and IATI: a guide for NGOs (2013). 
Also the NGO umbrella structure PARTOS in the Netherlands has documented experiences with 
IATI. 
  
Payment by Results and Resource Allocation Mechanisms are less known. Payment by 
Results is a relatively new funding mechanism, initially mainly applied in government-to-government 
aid, but also slowly finding its way in service delivery programmes of NGOs and other actors. In 
essence, its name describes what it is, payment is given only on the verified achievement of agreed 
results (BOND, 2014). The mechanism is promoted by donors as it is expected to increase 
effectiveness and Value for Money, and flexibility as targets are set at quite high levels. As the 
evidence base for these claims is still thin, BOND (2014) argues that there are most often alternative 
ways to achieve the same objectives. Early adopters in the NGO community in the UK also point at 
some substantial risks: it can stifle innovation amongst CSOs by the threat of financial loss, it tends 
to orient NGOs to safer target groups that provide more guarantees for results, and in a number of 
cases its application in more complex settings had to be abandoned. 
 
Resource Allocation Mechanisms (RAM) have been introduced by donors such as Denmark, 
Netherlands and Ireland (INTRAC 2014). They are normally composed of a base allocation which 
serves as a guaranteed minimum level of funding, complemented by a performance allocation which 
is discretionary funding based a number of performance indicators. In Denmark the performance-
based part of the RAM entails 24 assessment areas on which the CSO has to report (DANIDA 2014). 
The assessment covers almost all aspects of the functioning of CSOs and varies from checking the 
quality of the context analysis, the quality of capacity development, evidence of results in different 
areas, the application of a human rights based approach, their role as civil society organisations in 
Denmark, etc. All CSOs under this funding framework have to be screened on these 24 issues. The 
system was applied the first time in Denmark at the end of 2014. Our informants in this study judged 
the RAM screening as very heavy in terms of its administrative workload. 
 
As can be derived from the table, especially the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark have gone far in 
setting conditionalities related to effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and CSO competition.  
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Table 6: Stricter conditionalities related to effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and competition  
 NL UK DK DE SE EU CH BE FR 
Increasing effectiveness & efficiency 
Results-based 
management (including 
M&E, etc.) 
x x x x x x x x x 
Accountability & quality 
control measures 
x x x x x x x x x 
Value for Money  x        
Rewarding high performance 
Resource allocation 
mechanisms (RAM) 
x x x  x     
Payment by results  x        
Increasing accountability & transparency 
Accountability & quality 
control measures 
x x x x x x x x x 
IATI transparency 
standard 
x x      (x)  
Introducing market-based mechanisms 
Tendering systems / call 
for proposals 
x x x  x x    
 
It is clear that these conditions for funding have increased the pressure on CSOs to professionalise 
in terms of project management, result orientation and reporting. On the other hand they tend to 
come at a cost. From the interviews, existing studies and evaluation reports some of the downsides 
of the increased use of conditionalities are starting to emerge. We have grouped them around a 
number of themes in table 7. 
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Table 7: Side effects of increased use of conditionalities 
Problem Explanation  
Administrative burden & loss of 
flexibility 
The gradual addition of new (or expanding of existing) 
conditionalities increases the administrative burden for CSOs in 
North and South. In six countries of this study reference was 
made to this problem: Denmark (new RAM mechanism); Sweden 
(last funding scheme, but now improving); Netherlands (very 
high pressure under MFS-II); UK (admin burden is perceived to 
have increased drastically in areas of due diligence, project 
management, M&E, and continuous pressure to demonstrate 
added value, effectiveness & efficiency); Belgium (increased 
financial screening pressure and obligatory CSO collaboration 
with new instruments). The increased focus on long-term and 
detailed planning of projects also risks breeding bureaucracy, 
taking away flexibility and responsiveness in the implementation.  
Gradual erosion of right of 
initiative 
The expanding set of conditionalities also erodes the right of 
initiative. This is not really the case in Germany, France and 
Switzerland, also less in the Nordic countries. In the UK, the 
Netherlands and to a lesser extent Belgium the government is 
gradually increasing its grip on CSO programming thematically, 
geographically, regarding the type of southern partners, and 
conceptually (the intervention logic of the programmes). At the 
same time, renewal and innovation has been slow in some 
quarters of the CSO community, in this way providing the 
necessary space and incentives for donors to intervene.    
Increased risk for imposition of 
donor agenda’s in North & 
South 
A direct consequence of the previous issue is the increased risk 
for steering of outside agenda’s. In addition, several studies have 
observed that northern CSO are channeling the donor agendas 
further on to southern partners, either by imposing new thematic 
areas, pushing certain ways of working, and/or management 
styles. 
Competitive CSO behaviour The effects on the CSO sector of the increased use of competitive 
funding schemes (tenders, ..), together with the setting of a 
diverse set of conditionalities, are not well studied, but there are 
signs that it strengthens a donor-logic, with CSOs increasingly 
trying to comply with donor requirements to increase their 
chance for funding rather than being responsive to the needs of 
their target groups. 
Exclusion of smaller and 
grassroots CSOs, new social 
movements and loose networks 
The long list of conditionalities also implies that it is very difficult 
for CSOs and networks which have not reached the same type of 
organisational maturity as mainstream CSO to access key funding 
channels. Even if northern CSOs act as an intermediary they 
themselves might be less inclined for risk taking in the selection 
of southern partners. Some donors have developed separate 
funding channels for specific types of non-traditional actors, such 
as small CSOs and diaspora organisations, but overall it is 
perceived to be more difficult to provide core funding to newer 
organisational forms, such as social movements and more 
informal types of networks. 
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3.4 Early signs of changing donor – CSO relationships 
There are signs that some donors have reached a turning point. This section describes a number of 
recent developments which aim at establishing donor-CSO relationship that go beyond the 
effectiveness agenda, either by relaxing the conditionalities in certain areas, re-establishing the right 
of initiative, or actively pointing at the responsibility of donors to work on the enabling environment 
for CSOs.  
The 2011 OECD-DAC study and the good practice report with 12 lessons for partnering with 
CSOs (OECD-DAC, 2012) can be seen as a first collective effort since 2000 to build donor-CSO 
relationships on principles beyond the prevailing paradigm of aid effectiveness. The guidelines 
stress the importance of developing a comprehensive civil society policy, establishing a good policy 
dialogue, acknowledging the different types of CSO actors, the importance of the right of initiative, 
together with appropriate funding mechanisms, and establishing management procedures that 
balance learning and accountability. There is a clear call to avoid implementing funding mechanisms 
that lead to an excessive administrative burden or that risk the instrumentalisation of CSOs. 
 
The recent Danish CSO policy framework (2014) is in line with many of the OECD-DAC 
guidelines, but goes further in developing a progressive set of operating principles, such as 
respecting the diversity of CSOs, framing actions in a comprehensive analysis of the political-
economy of a given context and backed-up by explicit theories of change. The policy also pays 
significant attention to the responsibility of the Danish government in contributing to an enabling 
environment for CSOs in the partner countries and at home. 
The ongoing MFS-II funding framework in the Netherlands was perceived as heavy in terms of the 
administrative workload, and the way it imposed specific thematic issues. In the preparation of the 
new funding framework (Strategic Partnerships) the government explicitly aimed at doing 
away with some of the administrative excesses. In this latest round of funding, after screening 
proposals on a set of eligibility criteria, organisations were no longer asked to develop detailed logical 
frameworks and monitoring protocols, but were judged on the relevance of their generic theory of 
change (ToC) and their track record in lobby & advocacy. The 25 consortia that have been selected 
are expected to re-fine their ToC in consultation with in-country partners and the Dutch government 
in a second round. Some observers were carefully positive about these new modalities, but referred 
to the methodological pressure it created as it was a completely different way of developing proposals. 
The fact that it also entailed very substantial budget cuts has lowered the enthusiasm and created 
further havoc in an already distressed CSO sector. 
 
Also in the UK, the government has received critiques24 in independent reviews and from CSO 
quarters on the ever changing and stricter funding modalities. While not exclusively focused on 
CSO funding channels, DFID is launching an ambitious reform programme (‘Smart Rules’) 
to move away from an approach which is too technical and managerial, risk-averse, 
insufficiently focused on context, power and politics, and too much on short-term results (See 
also Box 1 on the DFID reform programme). Four elements underpin the Smart Rules25: 
1. Moving from rules to a more principles-based approach, creating deeper ownership and 
engagement across DFID 
2. Directing DFID’s effort proportionately on what matters most (i.e. by removing generic 
mandatory compliance tasks) 
 
24 See for example, the 2015 UK Aid Peer Review by OECD-DAC,  
25 Guest blog DFID: http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/dfid-is-changing-its-approach-to-better-address-the-underlying-causes-of-poverty-and-
conflict-can-it-work-guest-post-from-tom-wingfield-and-pete-vowles/ (accessed November 2015) 
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3. Simplifying and clarifying mandatory rules, designed to protect tax payers money 
4. Demonstrating the space for discretion where we will trust the judgement of frontline staff to 
innovate, take risks and adapt to realities on the ground 
 
Box 1: Recent DFID reforms to move away from an overly technical and 
managerial approach 
The overall idea is that the agency needs to create ‘space to understand and engage 
with local context and having the freedom (and capability) to design flexible and 
adaptive programmes. It means freeing up time for frontline staff to work on what 
matters most and being honest about failure and learning from what goes wrong’. 
There are reforms in three areas: 
 Process: the new operating framework focuses on stripping back process, 
reducing internal bureaucracy and removing non-value-added approval layers. 
They have cut more than 200 compliance tasks and replaced them by 37 
straightforward rules, 10 overall guiding principles., and a series of ‘good 
development in practice’ standards (political economy analysis, risk 
management, Do no harm, ..) 
 Capability: Recognising that the conventional linear, apolitical approach and 
assumptions are not going to work in many of the contexts that DFID 
operates, it wants to build its collective capability by finding more effective 
ways to share lessons from real world delivery on the ground and tap into 
implementing partners’ expertise. 
 Incentives and culture:  empowering staff to use professional judgement, 
generating open dialogue on lesson learning and failure, and running towards 
problems, in the knowledge that poor performing programmes never self-
correct.    
 
From guest blog by DFID’s new ‘Better Delivery Taskforce’: Tom Wingfield & Pete 
Vowles26 
  
It is still too early to assess the effects of this reform in DFID, but there seems to be a growing 
recognition of the problems with existing funding frameworks, and initial efforts are undertaken to 
change this practice. 
 
In Belgium, the government also acknowledges the administrative pressure resulting from all its 
narrative and financial planning and reporting requirements, and has committed itself to a 
simplification of the regulations. Draft texts of the new partnership (July 2015) between Belgian 
CSOs and the government have a separate chapter which list a number of initiatives to lower the 
burden related to planning & monitoring  (documentation), accountability procedures, financial 
audits,  and the financing instruments. 
 
In earlier sections (2.4), the EU Structured Dialogue process was described as a different way to 
establish ground rules for the EU support to CSOs in development cooperation. This process 
accumulated in the 2012 Communication on Civil Society in Development, with the guideline to 
work towards Roadmaps for each partner country on how to engage with civil society, based on a 
thorough analysis of the situation on the ground. The purpose of the roadmaps is “to improve the 
impact, predictability and visibility of EU actions, ensuring consistency and synergy throughout the 
various sectors covered by EU external relations. These roadmaps are also meant to trigger 
 
26 Ibid. 
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coordination and sharing of best practices with the Member States and other international actors, 
including for simplification and harmonisation of funding requirements”. A recent publication (2014) 
by Concord, the European NGO umbrella structure, looked specifically at the implementation of the 
Roadmaps by doing a survey amongst the CSO partners in its network. All in all, the survey recognises 
the improvement in the dialogue between EU institutions and civil society on the ground, and sees 
the Roadmap process as an important step forward. On the other hand, Concord sees room for 
improvement as in some countries the consultation was rather ad-hoc and the number of CSOs 
consulted was far too narrow. Also the engagement on political and policy issues and on human rights 
is still perceived to be too weak. 
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4 |  Emerging issues & opportunities 
4.1 Bringing it all together: review of the 2009 trends by Nijs & Renard 
  Table 8: Evolutions in bilateral thinking about NGO/CSO funding (update from Nijs & Renard 2009) 
2000-2009  
(Nijs & Renard) 
2009-2015 
(Huyse & De Bruyn) 
Relation government –NGOs/CSOs 
Allocations of funding through an open and 
competitive system ( sometimes labelled 
"marketisation") based on transparent criteria 
Intensive use of tenders and other competitive systems in UK, 
Netherlands and EU. Also opening up tenders up to private sector 
actors. Belgium will only make limited use of tenders. Nordic 
countries make limited use of competitive systems, aside from RAM 
system in Denmark. France, Germany and Switzerland have strong 
continuity in CSO funding relationships with limited number of 
CSOs. 
Thinking on a „new aid paradigm‟ mainly 
located within bilateral (like-minded 
countries) and multilateral agencies (World 
Bank) leads to questions on service delivery 
substitution by NGOs. Many NGOs 
alienated from this evolution, and feel 
threatened by it. 
“New aid paradigm” on aid effectiveness playing-out in most 
countries and funding schemes, especially through result-based 
management agenda. CSOs have complied for a large part, but 
developed own CSO Development Effectiveness Agenda (Istanbul), 
which takes different approach to effectiveness. The expected 
withdrawal from service-delivery roles did not materialise for key 
players such as UK and EU. Netherlands and Nordic countries are 
most explicit about importance of watchdog function for CSOs. 
Formulation, after consultation with NGOs, 
of a strategy/policy that emphasises intensive 
and/or extensive complementarity between 
bilateral and NGO aid 
In our sample, only 4 out of 9 (Denmark, France, Germany and 
EU)27 have up to date CSO policies. Especially UK, Netherlands, 
and Belgium are increasingly stressing complementarity with bilateral 
channel. 
Recognition of different roles, but emphasis 
on synergy between NGOs and bilateral aid 
See above. Germany, Switzerland, and Denmark are re-confirming 
right of initiative and do not push for synergy. 
Public funding dependency of NGOs 
regarded as unwise. Focus on popular 
support and fundraising by NGOs 
Dependency is still seen as problem (see for example 12 lessons 
report by OECD-DAC, 2012), but debate was only intensive in 
Netherlands recently. All in all gradual move in CSO community to 
try to access more public fundraising and other channels (eg. EU). 
/ New: From NGO to CSO – growing recognition of relevance of CSOs 
outside traditional NGO spectrum, including trade unions, social 
economy CSOs, citizen initiatives, faith-based organisations, social 
movements, .. This goes hand-in-hand with new roles (see 4.2.4) 
/ New: Increased focus on PS4D-: Donors look at private sector for 
different roles (implementation, financing, partnership, target of 
lobby & advocacy, ..) and encourage partnerships with CSOs 
/ New: Increased decentralisation – Donors are increasingly trying to 
decentralise their operations to the partner country level, including 
decision-making on funding. 
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2000-2009  
(Nijs & Renard) 
2009-2015 
(Huyse & De Bruyn) 
Modalities 
Programmatic approach is encouraged 
through broader agreements related to 
strategies and output/objectives 
Framework agreements are expanding in Nordic countries and UK, 
but growing critiques that they are again over-loaded with project-like 
reporting requirements and other conditionalities. Belgium pushes 
Belgian CSOs to improve coherence between different types of 
Belgian actors. Also opposite trend visible: service delivery roles 
pushed by EU and UK. 
Long-term funding agreements (3-6 years) No further changes in duration, while studies keep on recommending 
the need for longer funding agreements. 
Results-based management, stronger focus 
on M&E. NGOs must be able to 
demonstrate impact and contribution to 
official aid objectives. 
This agenda has gained a lot of traction and found its way in most 
donor countries, and in its most intensive form in UK, Netherlands 
and Sweden. Several donors are starting to question an over-focus on 
the effectiveness agenda. 
Flexible reporting and less bureaucratic 
control to make flexible support to 
southern NGOs possible 
Independent reviews indicating that reporting requirements and 
bureaucratic control are too heavy. Many policy intentions towards 
light reporting and less bureaucratic control, but not a lot happens on 
the ground. Direct funding only increasing in UK and EU (contrary 
to what emerges in other studies).  
Some outsourcing to umbrella 
organisations or external/private 
companies 
Outsourcing to CSO umbrella organisations mainly in Denmark, 
Sweden and Belgium (from 2017 onwards), and to some extent in 
France (with funds for diaspora organisations).  Increased use of 
companies to manage funding channels especially in Netherlands, 
UK and EU.   
Additional: austerity measures create new wave of organisational re-
structuring in donor agencies with implications for the way CSO 
funding is structured. 
More earmarking through special funds, 
and stricter conditions in co-financing 
without impinging on the right of initiative 
Earmarking mainly in UK, EU and Netherlands. Stricter conditions 
in co-financing in most countries, except Germany, France and 
Switzerland. Right of initiative is increasingly affected according to 
many observers. 
Focus on strategic policy management at 
macro level, importance of policy dialogue 
with NGOs 
Policy dialogue strengthened in EU and Denmark (recently also 
Sweden); in some countries stable (Switzerland, Germany); in some 
countries good at operational level but weak at strategic level (UK, 
Netherlands, Belgium, France) 
 
 
27 The Netherlands has a policy note on its new funding framework (Strategic Partnerships). Sweden is the process of developing a new 
CSO policy. Belgium and UK are in the process of developing new policy frameworks . 
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Strategy 
Funding must fit into official civil society 
strategy 
In absence of up-to-date CSO policies, it is rather overall aid policies 
and partner country -based strategies that determine CSO funding 
modalities and strategies. 
More direct funding of southern NGOs by 
bilateral donor 
This has more or less stagnated or decreased in most countries, 
except for UK and EU. 
 
Focus on lobbying and advocacy and 
mainstreaming of official aid cross-cutting 
issues. Service delivery interventions must 
respect Paris Declaration principles 
The expected shift from service-delivery roles to other roles did not 
materialise for key players such as UK and EU. Netherlands and 
Nordic countries are most explicit about watchdog function for 
CSOs.  
Paris Declaration and shift to sector and 
budget support is reflected in requirements 
related to more strategic approach of 
NGOs. 
Paris Declaration is less central in donor discourse. Budget support is 
decreasing as a support modality.   
 
Looking back at the 2009 analysis from Nijs and Renard, several of the trends they identified did 
materialise to some extent. The Paris Declaration was probably a key factor in the growing attention 
for results-based management in most countries, but turned out to be less influential on other aspects 
for the Nordic countries, Germany, Switzerland, France and Belgium. When looking at the nine 
cases in our study, the Nijs and Renard’s predictive analysis turned out to be mostly 
applicable to UK, Netherlands and EU, and for some aspects in the Nordic countries (use of 
framework agreements, importance of lobby & advocacy). In other donor countries in this study 
the predictions did not come through or took a different turn. 
4.2  Other emerging themes  
Aside from the comparison of the formal CSO policies and modalities of nine donors, the study is 
also an opportunity to review some of the underlying debates about CSO activities in developing 
countries that have been on the agenda for some time. For this section we use a wider group of 
literature, and the issues raised go beyond what one could conclude directly from the interviews and 
donor-related literature. 
4.2.1 ‘Too Close for Comfort’ revisited 
In their 1996 reference publication Hulme and Edwards wrote a critical analysis of donor-
CSO relationships in view of the steep rise of donor funding for development NGOs. The increase 
was explained by efforts to strengthen good governance agendas in developing countries but was also 
widely seen as attempts to replace core functions of the state and fill gaps in service delivery. Hulme 
and Edwards argued that the increased dependency of NGOs on donor funding undermined their 
capacity to contribute to the long-term goals of social justice and transformation. NGOs were 
argued to be too close for comfort to governmental donor agendas. The publication was picked-
up widely at the time and was used to trigger debates about the extent to which NGOs were 
instrumentalised for other agendas.   
 
Since then, the principles of autonomy and right of initiative have received more attention in the 
discourse of NGOs and CSOs. The question arises whether almost 20 years later the situation has 
changed. In a recent paper (Banks, Hulme & Edwards 2015), the same authors argue that the 
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mainstream NGO community is still struggling with similar issues, at the same time 
recognising that a smaller section of NGOs did renew their position and ways of working. 
 
There is no extensive study work on the degree of financial dependence of NGOs across OECD-
DAC countries (aside from a rough mapping by OECD-DAC in 2011), neither on the autonomy and 
right of initiative.  In our study we explicitly asked informants about this issue, resulting in a mixed 
picture as hinted in earlier sections. In countries such as Germany, France, Switzerland, Sweden and 
Denmark autonomy and the right of initiative are taken as a basic principle by the government. CSOs 
have been asked to professionalize in certain areas, but the steering is less on the actual programming. 
In Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK this is also the case in the discourse, but there is a clear 
trend in stressing certain roles of civil society and a systematic broadening of the conditionalities to 
access funding.   
 
A critical review of this debate can be found in an extensive study by the Nordic Africa Institute 
(2013). It paints a very critical picture of the consequences of the way CSOs are currently funded. 
They observe four main trends, which together risk decreasing the relevance of CSOs (SIPU 2013, 
p. 25): 
 CSOs increasingly compete for funds and are encouraged to adopt more entrepreneurial 
ways of working, showing self-sufficiency (marketisation). 
 This in turn leads to the rise of managerial layers within CSOs that separate organisational 
control from operational work and ownership by creating professional management 
positions. These specialise in accepting goals from above (donors) and setting goals for 
below (field staff and ultimately target groups) (managerialisation). 
 These trends are coupled with increasing focus on evidence-based ways of working, based 
in ideas around scientific measurement, such as results based management and how it is 
applied (scientisation), and 
 CSOs working according to standardised compliance regimes, with increased use of auditing, 
indicators and templates (standardisation). 
The authors argue that: “Taken together, it is argued that these four international trends 
together lead to ever more donor oriented CSOs that may not be as effective as agents of 
social change as they could be. The outcome is that they are in danger of becoming less engaged 
with their target groups, may be forced to abandon their long-term strategies in favour of supporting 
imposed donor strategies, leaving them disempowered in carrying out their specific mandate.” 
4.2.2 New impetus for ‘slow-funding’ frameworks? 
‘Programmes must be measured based on whether they have affected the space of the possible, and laid the 
groundwork for long-term, ongoing war, not success in a single battle.’ 
 (In ‘Plan for Sailboats, Not Trains’, Kleinfeld 2015) 
The previous chapter ended with a list of examples of changing practices in the funding of CSOs, 
which seem to step away from an excessive focus on aid effectiveness. They vary from initiatives at 
the operational level, like cutting back on administrative procedures that have limited added value, to 
more fundamental principles like re-confirming the right of initiative, and recognising the role of the 
government in creating an enabling environment for CSOs.  These were only a few examples of a 
longer list of donor intentions to change the nature of CSO funding.  
 
This snapshot of reforms and intentions seems to indicate that donors are realising that there 
is a limit to the makeability of civil society, and that processes of change require patience 
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and flexible mechanisms, acknowledging the quickly changing face of the CSO landscape 
and therefore funding opportunities. This trend could be described as a growing interest in what 
we could call ‘slow funding’, building on local dynamics, a deep understanding of what is 
happening on the ground, focusing on experimentation and learning, and taking a long term 
perspective. In the following paragraphs examples are provided of new initiatives which resonate 
with the idea of ‘slow funding’. 
 
A number of new initiatives have tried to capture the principles for an alternative approach to 
development, such as the Doing Development Differently initiative28, and thinking and working 
politically29 (Green 2014). These approaches emphasize ‘the importance of understanding and 
working with the grain of local context, and a project cycle which replaces ‘The Plan’ with a messy 
process of trying, failing, learning and adapting (and trying again)’ (Green 2014). Another alternative 
set of principles were developed in a recent publication by Pinnington (2014), outlining what Green 
(2014) describes as barefoot version of doing development differently (Box 2). These generic principles 
were developed for the development community as a whole, but have specific significance for CSOs. 
 
Box 2: A different approach to doing development: ‘Local First in Practice’ (Pinnington 
2014)  
Good Practice Principles: 
1. Listening: design and adjust according to locally-felt concerns and shifts in the local 
context; listen to and act upon information and feedback received. 
2. Harnessing and deploying latent capabilities: before identifying gaps and needs, look at 
what already exists in terms of local resources and capabilities, and how they can be 
supported. 
3. Providing support in a timely and responsive way: use small-grant mechanisms to respond 
to opportunities as they arise and to react to particular events; provide capacity support 
that is driven by local realities and priorities. 
4. Promoting participation: in all stages (research, planning, implementation, monitoring), 
facilitate participation that empowers local actors to influence and drive processes of 
change in their societies. Participation can also promote accountability. 
5. Recognising that change is a process: rather than leading, facilitate progressive, cumulative 
change over time; be open to testing, learning and developing through long-term 
engagement and repeated cycles of action. 
6. Broadening the definition of success: balance the prioritisation of results to include both 
tangible and less tangible aims (such as changes in attitudes and behaviours). 
 
Finally, the London School of Economics (Howell 2012) came up with a specific set of operational 
principles for the strengthening of civil society in developing countries. They are based on extensive 
evaluation research of CSO programmes funded by AusAID in the period 2011-2012. Howell’s 
research reveals the importance of a set of operating principles for the effective working of civil 
society, including: 
 the importance of uncovering local cultural 'norms' about democratisation, poverty and 
accountability 
 the importance of placing donor engagement within a political debate about the relative roles 
of civil society, the state and the marketplace in providing for global security – not just for 
donors but also for partner countries, where the very idea of civil society might be perceived 
as threatening 
 
28 See http://buildingstatecapability.com/the-ddd-manifesto/ (accessed November 2015) 
29 See http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/thinking-and-working-politically-update-where-have-aid-agencies-consultants-etc-got-to/ 
(accessed November 2015) 
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 avoidance of the tendency to give precedence to non-governmental organisations at the 
expense of other pivotal civil organisations like faith groups and trade unions 
 the significance of local context, including the history of state-civil relations and competing 
visions of civil society 
 the significance of the 'War on Terror' in decisions about development aid and the danger 
that civil society organisations are drawn into security agendas either as possible suspects or 
as potential anti-radicalisation agents. 
The research was picked-up by AusAID and integrated as guiding principles in their work with CSOs 
since 2012. 
4.2.3 Building blocks emerging for coordinated approach of CSO financing? 
In the study we observe a number of drivers at different levels of the aid system which together create 
incentives for a coordinated approach at country level either through mechanisms such as the multi-
donor funds (INTRAC 2014b) or through increased coordination at EU-level. First of all, from the 
side of OECD-DAC, there is a clear recommendation that DAC members should conduct more 
joint assessments of CSOs (Lesson 4). Secondly, we already described the Aid Effectiveness Agenda 
as an additional driver towards the creation of multi-donor funds in section 1.3. A third driver relates 
to the gradual trend for decentralised funding, which is decided and coordinated in-country. This 
creates another opportunity for the coordination of the work of different bilateral actors at country 
level as they have more flexibility and decision making power to organise these type of arrangements. 
Finally, donors such as Belgium and Denmark have indicated their commitment to joint 
programming for the bilateral channel at the European level. As there are growing linkages being 
built between bilateral and CSO cooperation channels, this again points to the direction of the 
European level.  
Three important questions emerge from this trend related to (1) the best coordination structure, (2) 
the risk of unequal access to the funds through gate keeping processes, and finally (3) the risk for a 
further distortion in the balance of power between donors and CSO beneficiaries. Regarding the best 
intermediary structure to play a coordination role there are several options. It could either be divided 
between bilateral donors on ad-hoc basis depending for example on who has the largest CSO support 
programme in a given country or the in-house expertise on certain sectors. In other countries third 
parties have been selected such as NGO umbrella structures and consultancy bureaus to play this 
role. Some might argue that the EU level is becoming more interesting than in the past to take up 
this role since its capacity to coordinate CSO programming has increased due to the CSO Roadmap 
process. The choice of the best coordination structure is highly contextual and should probably also 
be informed by the second and third question. Pooling resources into larger schemes always holds 
the risk that access to the funds needs to be governed by complex regulations and conditions to 
minimize the risks for corruption or elite capture. A perverse side effect can be that it closes off the 
possibility for smaller CSOs or networks of CSOs to access this type of finance as they might not 
have all the systems and procedures in place. The challenge is therefore to avoid a gate keeping 
mechanism which implies that it can only be accessed by highly professionalised CSOs or CSOs with 
the right connections. A third question relates to the fact that the pooling of resources also means 
that the power to decide whether to fund certain CSOs or not is concentrated in one entity. If not 
well managed, individual CSO will have few alternatives for funding and little power to resist certain 
types of conditions if all the main donors pool their funds. 
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All in all, if this trend materialises it could have significant implications for Northern CSOs as the 
momentum of CSO funding would increasingly shift to the South, possibly also easening access to 
funding for southern CSOs, but also holding important risks as described above.  
4.2.4 Evolving roles for northern NGOs/CSOs 
Throughout the text there were references to the evolving roles of northern NGOs and the fact that 
there seems to be less of a consensus on the way forward than reported in earlier studies. In this 
paper we argued that new roles have emerged as a consequence of (1) new types of CSO actors that 
get access to donor funding, (2) a widening of the development agenda with new global goals and 
new mechanisms, and (3) the growing capacity of southern CSOs. Several studies and reports are 
presenting (sometimes conflicting) suggestions on the way forward. We just highlight some recent 
positions brought forward from different quarters. 
 
Four traditional roles allocated to northern CSOs were those of implementing service delivery 
programmes, providing capacity development services,  supporting lobby & advocacy programmes, 
and development education and awareness raising. In earlier sections we described how all of these 
roles still exist and how different donors are pushing different roles. 
 
Outside this traditional list of roles the following additional roles (non-exhaustive list) have emerged 
or have been suggested for northern NGOs over the last decade (Green 2013, Hulme et al. 2014, 
Bond 2015, Flemish NGO Federation 2015): 
 Social entrepreneurs: combining social/developmental objectives with economic objectives 
 Brokers/facilitators: CSOs initiating and facilitating multi-stakeholder processes of different 
types of state and non-state actors to tackle collective action problems 
 Supporting existing social movements: NGOs can support member-based social 
movements in ‘connecting the dots’ so that local agendas are connected to national and 
international agenda’s; to support them in campaigning; etc.. 
 Working at home: changing the policies and practices of northern countries related to 
climate change, value chains, trade & investment, taxes paid by multinationals, migration, 
etc. 
 Partnering with the private sector to develop and/or implement innovative solutions for 
development problems 
 Facilitating South-South cooperation or engaging in trilateral cooperation 
 Addressing humanitarian crises wherever they arise 
 Peacebuilding and work in fragile states where local civil society is compromised 
 Advocate and champion for the socially excluded 
 Providing ‘on demand’ technical expertise and capacity building 
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Appendix  - Interviews 
 
  
Country Name Organisation Type of actor 
Belgium Koen Frederix NGO Federatie CSO 
Germany Jana Rosenboom VENRO CSO 
Germany Klaus Wardenbach BMZ Government 
Germany Volker Visarius Engagement Global Government 
Denmark Henrik Nielsen NGO Forum CSO 
Denmark Erik Vithner CISU CSO 
Denmark Jens Kåre Rasmussen Department for Humanitarian Relief, 
Civil Society and Technical Assistance 
Government 
France Bénédicte Hermelin CoordinationSud CSO 
France Valérie Huguenin DPO/AFD Government 
Netherlands Koos De Bruyn Partos CSO 
Netherlands Lau Schulpen CIDIN Research 
Sweden Annica Sohlström Forum Syd CSO 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Eva Christina Nilsson 
Konrad Specker 
Swedish Mission Council 
SDC 
CSO 
Government 
UK George McLaughlin DFID Government 
UK Rose Longhurst BOND CSO 
EU Jean Bossuyt ECDPM Research 
EU/ 
Netherlands 
Alfonso Medinilla ECDPM Research 
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